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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890272-CA

v.
Category No. 2

ONAN FORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly found that the

showup identification procedure was not so suggestive so as to
create a substantial likelihood of misidentification?
2.

Whether the trial court properly found that

defendant was not prejudiced by the uncounseled pretrial contact
between defendant and the County Attorney's Office?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30(a) (1982)t
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Onan Ford, was charged with Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1978) (R. 1)

Defendant was convicted as charged

after a jury trial held on June 29 and 30, 1988, in the Second
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah,
the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge, presiding (R. 284, 289).
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Roth to a term of not less than
five (5) years and which may be for life in the Utah State Prison
(R. 289).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 11, 1988 at about 6:00 p.m., a man described
as a black male entered the Gas-n-Go convenience store at 110
Patterson Avenue in Ogden, Utah (R. 313, 321-22).

The man was

about five-feet-eight to nine inches tall, wearing a green
jacket, red scarf, grey hat, light brown pants and white tennis
shoes (R. 323). His hat was pulled down over his forehead and
the scarf pulled up just under the nose (R. 324). John G'rarcia,
the store attendant, observed that the man appeared too "bundled
up"

for the 40 to 45 degree weather and felt something was wrong

(R. 321-22).

The man asked Mr. Garcia for the restroom key and

walked outside to the restroom door (R. 322). About ten minutes
later, he returned, placed the restroom key on the counter, and
left the store (R. 322).
A few minutes later, the man re-entered the store,
picked up a box of Reynolds Wrap, and placed it on the counter
(R. 326). When Mr. Garcia asked if that was everything, the man

pulled a small .22 caliber handgun from his right pocket and
said, "Give me all the money you have got."

(R. 327). Mr.

Garcia responded, "if you want it, go for it" as he opened the
cash register and activated a silent alarm (R. 328-30).

The man

switched the gun to his left hand, reached over the counter, and
grabbed all the five, ten, and twenty dollar bills in the
register (R. 330). He then exited the store and ran east on
Patternson Avenue (R. 331). The Reynolds Wrap box was left on
the counter (R. 332).
Mr. Garcia immediately called the Ogden Police
Department and gave a description of the robber and the direction
of his getaway (R. 332). Officer Tony Huemiller of the Ogden
City Police Department was nearby as the police dispatcher
described the robber and his escape route on Patterson Avenue (R.
360-61).

Officer Huemiller proceeded to the scene, exited his

vehicle, and began to look for footprints in the snow which might
indicate the robber's path (R. 361-62).
Huemiller observed fresh footprints in the snow going
east in an alleyway between Patterson Avenue and 30th street (R.
362).

The length of the stride between steps indicated that the

person who made the prints was running.

Jd.

Huemiller followed

the footprints up the alleyway and across Lincoln Avenue until
they went over a fence into a backyard

Ici. Near the corner of a

house, Huemiller found a green jacket, and a hat draped over some
bushes (R. 364). Huemiller radioed for another officer to pick
up the items and Huemiller continued the pursuit (R. 364).
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Huemiller followed the footprints up the sidewalk,
across several streets, and through a parking lot (R. 364-65).
When the footprints crossed areas where the snow had been cleared
or melted, Huemiller would fan out in a circular pattern until he
could pick up the footprints again (R. 364-65).

The footprints

had a distinctive pattern of circles on the treads which appeared
to be a tennis shoe pattern (R. 363). Huemiller observed an
identical set of prints travelling parallel in the opposite
direction

Id.
Eventually, the footprints went up a driveway and porch

of a house located at 3237 Jefferson Avenue (R. 366-67).
Huemiller knocked on the door of the house and a little girl
answered (R. 367). The girl said that her father, Richard Jones,
lived there, but that her father, mother, and some friends had
gone to the store in a light blue vehicle (R. 368). Upon
request, the girl gave Huemiller a picture of her father (R.
369).
After some time, a car pulled into the driveway and a
black male and black female got out (R. 369). The male's shoe
print did not match the footprints.

Ici. However, a warrant

check revealed an outstanding arrest warrant on the male, Edward
Lucas, and he was arrested and transported to the Weber County
Jail (R. 369).
Soon after, a light blue car drove by with two black
male and two black female occupants (R. 369). The car was
stopped and the driver was identified as Richard Jones (R. 370).
Mr. Jones was advised of his Miranda rights and taken to
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Huemiller's vehicle (R. 370). Mr. Jones was wearing tennis
shoes, but the pattern did not match the followed footprints (R.
370).
Defendant was in the rear driver's side seat of the
stopped vehicle (R. 370, 396). He was wearing brown corduroy
pants, a gray jacket, and white Nike tennis shoes (R. 371). The
tread pattern on defendant's shoes matched the footprints (R.
371).

Defendant was placed in the passenger seat of a police

vehicle and advised of his Miranda rights (R. 396). Defendant
stated that he understood his rights and agreed to talk to the
police (R. 396-97).
Defendant produced a Utah driver's license as
identification (R. 397), He was advised that footprints
resembling the pattern on his shoes were observed leaving the
scene of an aggravated robbery (R. 397). Defendant responded
that he had nothing to do with a robbery and that he was with his
friends all night 1^*. He was informed that he was not under
arrest and was asked to accompany the officer to the police
station to clear up the matter.

Id.

Meanwhile, the items discarded in the bush were
recovered by the police (R. 414-15).

They included a jacket, a

hat, and a handgun (R. 406-08, 414). In the left pocket of the
jacket, $320.00 in cash was discovered in the following
denominations:

two $20.00 bills; eleven $10.00 bills; and

thirty-four $5.00 bills (R. 406). An unspent .22 cartridge was
found in the right jacket pocket (R. 407). An audit of the cash
register revealed that approximately $322.00 was missing from the
register (R. 333).
-5-

The victim/ Mr. Garcia, agreed to accompany Officer
Gary Peterson to the police station to make a written statement
(R. 334). During the statement, Officer Peterson was notified
that a suspect was in custody and was present in the police
station (R. 410). A showup was quickly arranged and Mr. Garcia
was asked if he could identify the robber among three black males
who had been placed in an office in the police station (R. 33637, 410-11).

Without hesitation, Mr. Garcia positively

identified defendant as the robber (R. 335-39).

Defendant was

arrested for aggravated robbery (R. 376).
While being booked into the Weber County Jail, the
booking officer asked defendant whether, "when [he] was in the
store, did [he] think about getting caught and going to prison"
(R. 377). Defendant responded, "Yeah, I thought about it."

Id.

He then paused and blurted out, "while I was laying in bed at
home."
Id.
Detective Jerry Smith of the Ogden City Police
Department recovered the Reynolds Wrap box which had been left on
the store counter and dusted it for finger prints (R. 415). A
left thumb print found on the Reynolds Wrap box was compared with
defendant's left thumb print and found to be identical (R. 42728, 432).
James Gaskill, Director of the Crime Laboratory at
Weber State College, recovered hair samples from the hat which
had been discarded with the jacket and gun (R. 137-38).
Gaskill compared the hair samples with others taken from
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Mr.

defendant and determined that the hair samples taken from the hat
were completely consistent with the hair samples from defendant
(R. 445). He determined that there was only a one in fivehundred chance that a person other than defendant was the source
of the hair sample found in the hat.

Id.

Mr. Gaskill also determined that the picture of the
suspect's shoe prints in the snow were consistent with the shoes
worn by defendant (R. 147-48).

He further concluded that less

than 15% of the shoes sales in the Ogden area are size ten shoes
as shown in the shoe print photograph (R. 455-56).
At trial, defendant's girlfriend, Robin Bailey,
testified that she was with defendant all day and night on the
day of the robbery (R. 481). However, on cross-examination she
admitted that she would do anything to keep defendant out of
prison, including lying (R. 494). Richard Jones also testified
that defendant was not out of his sight on the night of the
robbery (R. 497-98, 515).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts and circumstances of this particular case
establish that the showup identification procedure was not so
suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of
misidentification.

The victim had ample opportunity to view

defendant face to face during the crime in a lighted store at the
distance of two to three feet.

The victim had good reason to pay

a high degree of attention to defendant's characteristics and
gave a detailed description of defendant to the police.

The

victim unhesitatingly identified defendant within a matter of two
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to three hours after the crime.

Finally, defendant was not under

arrest at the time of the showup and had waived his right to
counsel.

Under these circumstances, the statutory lineup

requirements were inapplicable and the showup identification was
reliable.
Defendant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel and his defense was not prejudiced by the uncounseled
pretrial contact between he and the County Attorney's Office.
The trial prosecutor was shielded from any knowledge or
information arising from the allegedly improper contact.
Further, the eyewitness and physical evidence was so
overwhelmingly incriminating that no substantial likelihood of a
different result in the absence of the alleged error exists.
Therefore, any error was harmless at best.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE SHOWUP
INDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE.
Defendant claims that he was subjected to an improper
police lineup which did not comply with statutory and
constitutional requirements.

Because of the claimed

irregularities, he requests that the case be reversed and
remanded for a new trial and that the victim's eyewitness
identification be suppressed.

Defendant's claim should be

As authority, defendant cites Utah Code Ann. S 77-8-2 (1982)
and U.S. Constitutional amendment VI in support of his due
process claim. (Brief of App. at 16). Because defendant does
not cite or argue seperate state constitutional grounds, this
court should not consider defendant's claim under the Utah
Constitution. See State v. Williams, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 52
n. 12 (S. Ct. 05/05/89).
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rejected.
The facts and circumstances of the present case
establish that a showup, not a lineup, was conducted soon after
the robbery.

As set forth in the statement of facts above, the

robbery occurred at a convenience store at about 6:00 p.m. (R.
313, 321-22).

Defendant entered the store and asked the

attendant, John Garcia, for the restroom key (R. 322). Mr.
Garcia noticed that defendant was too "bundled up" for the
relatively mild winter weather (R. 321-22).

He described

defendant as about five-foot-eight or nine inches tall, wearing a
green jacket, red scarf, grey hat, light brown pants, and white
tennis shoes (R. 323).
About ten minutes later, defendant returned the
restroom key and left the store (R. 322). Defendant re-entered
the store a few minutes later and picked up a box of Reynolds
Wrap and placed it on the counter in front of Mr. Garcia (R.
326).

When Mr. Garcia asked defendant if that was everything,

defendant pulled a small handgun from his right pocket and said
"Give me all the money you have got."

(R. 327). Mr. Garcia

opened the cash register and said, "if you want it, go for it"
(R. 328-30).

Defendant reached over the counter towards Mr.

Garcia and took the money out of the register (R. 330).
Defendant then exited the store (R. 331).
A silent alarm having been activated, the police
quickly responded to the scene (R. 329, 403). Officer Gary
Peterson arrived at 6:30 P.M. and obtained a detailed description
of the robber from Mr. Garcia (R. 403-4).
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Mr. Garcia accompanied

Officer Peterson to the Ogden City Police Station to give a
written statement regarding the crime (R. 839). About twenty to
thirty minutes into the statement, Officer Peterson was notified
that a suspect was in custody at the police station (R. 410,
839).

It was determined that an immediate showup would

facilitate the ongoing investigation.

Id.

Meanwhile, footprints in the snow had been followed
from the scene of the crime and defendant had been taken into
custody for further questioning, but was not under arrest (R.
362-67, 397). Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and
agreed to talk to the police (R. 396-97).

According to the

police, defendant did not at any time request the presence of
counsel (R. 818, 826, 830, 834, 841, 851, 853). 2
Because Mr. Garcia was present in the police station at
the time defendant arrived for questioning, the police arranged a
showup to determine whether defendant should be further detained
(R. 824). Since two other black males had been detained at the
same time, the police placed dbfendant in a room with the other
detainees to assume a more accurate identification (R. 825). Mr.
Garcia was permitted to view the three black males through a oneway window (R. 375). Mr. Garcia immediately pointed to defendant
and said "he is the one."

,Id. The police did not make any

suggestive comments to Mr. Garcia regarding which person to
identify (R. 336). The police urged Mr. Garcia to be cautious in
his identification to assure accuracy (R. 374). Each detainee
Defendant testified that he requested counsel every five to ten
minutes which testimony was apparently disbelieved by the trial
judge (R. 533).
-10-

was asked to say, "give me all the money you have got." (R. 338).
Again, Mr. Garcia immediately identified defendant's voice as
that of the robber (R. 338). At trial, Mr. Garcia testified that
he had no hesitation at all in identifying defendant in court as
the robber (R. 339) .
In determining whether the showup procedure in the
present case was proper, a brief review of similar identification
cases is helpful.

In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the

United States Supreme Court discussed the due process
considerations of out-of-court identifications.

In Stovall, a

woman had been stabbed 11 times by her assailant,

^d. at 295.

The defendant was taken to the hospital where the victim had just
undergone major surgery to save her life.

.Id. The defendant was

the only black man in the room, was handcuffed, and surrounded by
five police officers.

IdL

From her hospital bed, the victim

identified defendant as her assailant.
voice identification.

Id.

She also made a

Ici. At trial, she made an independent in

court identification of defendant.

Id.

Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the high
court ruled that exigent circumstances justified the suggestive
showup. Jd. at 302. The need for immediate action made the usual
police station lineup procedures impracticable
defendant's due process rights were not violated

Id.

Thus, the

Id,

Later, in Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188, (1972), the
United States Supreme Court again addressed the subject of
identification procedures.

In Bigqers, a rape victim viewed her

assailant for a considerable amount of time but could only give
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police a "general description."

Ri. at 200.

She was shown

several photographs (thirty to forty) and picked out a man as
having features similar to those of her assailant, but could not
positively identify any of the suspects.

Ici. at 195.

Approximately seven months after the commission of the crime, the
victim was brought to the police station to view the defendant
who was being held on another charge,

^d.

The police were

unable to construct a lineup due to the inability to locate
persons who fit the defendant's unusual description.

Id.

Instead^ a showup was conducted which consisted of the defendant
walking past the victim and saying "shut up or I'll kill you."
Id.

The victim positively identified the defendant as the

assailant and he was subsequently convicted

Ld.

On appeal, the

defendant claimed that the identification and the circumstances
surrounding it failed to comport with due process requirements
Id at 193.
In rejecting the defendant's due process claim, the
court found that the considerable opportunity of the rape victim
to view her assailant during the commission of the crime was a
substantial factor outweighing the seven month lapse of time
between the crime and the showup.

]^d. at 200-01.

The court

noted that the victim's record for reliability was good where she
had refused to identify numerous other suspects.

Id.

Weighing

all the factors, the court found no substantial likelihood of
misidentification.

Id.

Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has permitted showup
type identification procedures under a variety of circumstances.
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In State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d 396f 473 P.2d 388 (1970), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the rules regarding the right to counsel
at identification proceedings were inapplicable to non-lineup
confrontations which occurred as a result of an immediate pursuit
and apprehension of the suspect within minutes of the crime.
at 392.

Id.

In McGee, the victim arrived at the police station

within 15-20 minutes after the suspect was apprehended and the
victim positively identified the suspect as the robber.

Icl. at

390.
In State v. Wettstein, 28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084
(1972), the Utah Supreme Court recited several factors which
should be considered in evaluating the totality of the
circumstances surrounding identification procedures:
there justification for the procedure;

(2) was there a necessity

for using the type of identification employed;
circumstances of an urgent character;

(1) was

(3) were the

(4) was there a chance

that the procedure utilized would lead to misidentification;

(5)

what opportunity and length of time did the witness have to
observe the accused; and

(6) how much time has elapsed from the

time of the incident to the identification?

Id. at 1087. The

Wettstein court concluded that the somewhat suggestive
photographic display shown to the witness within hours of the
incident was not prone to misidentification.

Ld. at 1087.

The Utah Supreme Court also validated a showup
procedure in State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 442, 511 P.2d 159 (1973)
where two black males tied and bound two women in the back room
of a downtown store and robbed them.
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Id. at 160.

The victims

were able to free themselves and call the police.

Ici. The

police arrived quickly and detained two men fitting the
description of the assailants just one and one-half blocks away
from the crime scene,

^d.

Within ten to fifteen minutes of the

robbery, the police took the victims to where the two suspects
were being detained and without any prompting, the victims
identified the suspects as the robbers.

Id.

The Court explained that it was entirely proper to have
the victims observe the men being detained.

J^ci. A prompt showup

procedure soon after a crime is committed is preferred.

If the

person being detained cannot be identified as the assailant, then
the detainee may be allowed to proceed on his way.

Ici. Further,

"[a] victim of a robbery should not be denied an opportunity to
see the robber until [his or] her memory might fade and thus be
less reliable."

Ld.

To view a suspect immediately after the

crime enables a victim to be more positive in making a true and
correct identification.

Ijd. The "greater the elapse of time,

the greater would be the chance for a misidentification.M

Id.

It is thus a safety factor to the innocent to be seen "while the
details of dress and features are fresh in the minds [sic] of the
victim."

Id,
In State v. Ek, 526 P.2d 359 (Utah 1974), the victim of

a robbery was shown a picture of the defendant and was permitted
to view him in a hospital.

Ici. at 359.

the defendant as one of the robbers

Ld.

The victim identified
The Court noted that at

the time of the showup, no charge had been filed against the
defendant and that the officers were merely attempting to
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ascertain who committed the crime. J^d. Accordingly, the Court
found that the showup procedure was proper to secure the
identification of the robber.

Id.

Similarly, in State v. demons, 580 P.2d 601 (Utah
1978), a rape victim contacted the police soon after the assault.
Id. at 602.

She described her assailant as black, clean-shaven

with a puffy afro hairdo, and wearing a brown leather jacket.
Id.

The police responded immediately and detained two suspects

nearby,

^d.

The victim was taken to the first detainee where

she told police that he was not the man who had assaulted her
Id.

She was then taken to the other detainee where she

positively identified him as the rapist.

Ij-I* The Court again

upheld the showup procedure as a helpful and accurate method of
determining whether a suspect is or is not the perpetrator of the
offense.

Id.
In State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980), the

Utah Supreme Court further clarified the test to be applied to
identification procedures:
Police identification procedures such as
photograph displays, lineups, showups, and
the like, do not deny the accused due process
of law unless, under a totality of the
circumstances, they are so unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification as to deny the
accused a fair trial. Where an
identification procedure, even though
suggestive, does not give rise to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification#
no due process violation has occurred. In
determining the reliability of the
identification under the totality of the
circumstances, the court must also consider
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime, [2]
the witness's degree of attention, [3] the
15-

accuracy of any prior description of the
criminal, [4] the level of certainty
demonstrated during the identification
procedure, [5] and the time between the crime
and the identification.
Id. at 357 (numerical designations added).

Thus, the five factor

McCumber test set forth above must be applied to a totality of
the circumstance due process review of an identification
procedure.
In State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984), the Court
distinguished between the familiar "lineup" procedures
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-1, et seq., and a simple
"showup" procedure.

Ld. at 763.

In Poteet, the police officer

stood the suspects along a chain link fence and permitted the
assault victim to view the suspects.

Ijd. at 763.

The victim,

who had been badly beaten, identified three suspects as his
assailants.

Ijd.

In upholding the showup procedure, the court

emphasized that the appellant had been advised of his right to
counsel and voluntarily varied it prior to the showup.
Considering the circumstances surrounding the showup, the court
found the identification evidence admissable.

Id.

Applying the case law to facts of the present case, the
showup evidence was admissible.

First, the victim, Mr. Garcia,

had ample opportunity to view defendant face to face in a lighted
store at the distance of two to three feet (R. 343). The victim
viewed defendant as he asked for the restroom key, as he returned
the key, as he re-entered the store, and as he pointed a gun at
the victim and asked for the money in the cash register (R. 322,
326, 327).
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Second, the victim viewed defendant under circumstances
which caused the victim to pay a high degree of attention to
defendant's dress and features.

Third, the victim's description

of the robber was detailed and accurate.

The victim identified

the robber as a black male, five-feet-eight to nine inches tall,
wearing a green jacket, red scarf, grey hat, light brown pants,
and white tennis shoes (R. 323).
Fourth, the victim's level of certainty during the
identification procedure was immediate and without hesitation (R.
375).

The victim identified both defendant's features and voice

(R. 375, 338). No suggestive comments were made by the police
and defendant was given the benefit of having two other black
males included in the showup (R. 336, 375, 825).
Finally, the lapse of time between the crime and the
showup was brief.

The victim called the police at about 6:30

p.m. immediately after the crime (R 332) • Officer Huemiller
responded, followed the suspects footprints in the snow, and
arrived at the suspect's residence within fifteen minutes (R.
360, 362, 391). Within a matter of minutes, defendant and three
others were detained when their vehicle approached the residence
(R. 369-70).

Defendant and Mr. Jones were asked to accompany the

officers to the police station for further questioning (R. 371).
Soon after arriving at the police station, the showup was
conducted and the victim positively identified defendant as the
robber (R. 372-75).
Another factor to be considered under the totality of
the circumstances is that defendant was informed of his Miranda
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rights, acknowledged his understanding, and voluntarily waived
those rights prior to the showup (R. 396-97)

Contrary to

defendant's claim, he did not request an attorney before or
during the showup (R. 818, 826, 830, 834, 841, 851, 853).
Further, defendant was not under arrest at the time of the showup
(R. 397).
Based upon the evidence, the trial court found that the
identification procedure was a showup, not a lineup, and that
there was nothing to indicate any possibility of
misidentification.
pp. 9-10).

(Transcript dated June 7th and 8th, 1988 at

The court explained that simply putting two other

individuals with defendant does not make it a lineup.

Id.

Rather, the additional persons were included for defendant's
benefit.

Id.
Accordingly, this Court should find that under the

totality of the circumstances, the showup identification
procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to an
irreparable mistaken identification.

Further, this court should

find that the statutory procedures for a formal lineup were
inapplicable under the circumstances and that in any event,
defendant waived his right to counsel.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS FOR PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT.
Defendant claims that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel prior to trial due to prosecutorial
misconduct.

Specifically, defendant claims that the pros€»cution
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had an improper contact with him, in the absence of his counsel,
during a pretrial "sting operation" initiated by defendant and in
which defendant cooperated.

Defendant's claim should be

considered meritless.
Prior to trial, defendant contacted the Weber County
Attorney's Office to disclose that he had information regarding a
criminal case against his cellmate (R. 547, 552-53).
Subsequently, an agreement was reached between defendant and the
County Attorney's Office that defendant would cooperate in a
"sting operation" designed to recover stolen property in
defendant's cellmate's case (R. 285-86)(See Addendum "A", Letter
of Agreement).

In exchange, the prosecution agreed to take no

position on defendant's sentence, to take no position on the gun
enhancement charge, to write a letter to the Board of Pardon
describing defendant's cooperation, and to do everything in it's
power to assure that defendant would serve any possible sentence
in a facility other than the Utah State Prison.

Ici. The

agreement was reached without the knowledge of defendant's
attorney, Merlin Calver (R. 646-47).
During the "sting operation," defendant made allegedly
incriminating statements regarding his case which statements were
recorded by police officers monitoring the operation by a body
wire placed on defendant (R. 612-14).

When defendant later

disclosed to his attorney that he had been secretly working with
the police and the prosecution, defendant's attorney filed a bar
complaint against the prosecuting attorneys involved and withdrew
from the case (R. 645).
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As a result, defendant moved to dismiss the charges or
to recuse the Weber County Attorney's Office (R. 57-58, (28-29).
An evidentiary hearing was held prior to trial on defendant's
motions.

The evidence established that the prosecuting attorney

in defendant's case had been shielded from any knowledge of the
substance of defendant's allegedly incriminating statements
during the sting operation (R. 635, 677-78, 707). Based on this
evidence, Judge Roth ruled that defendant's case had not been
compromised or prejudiced in any way as a result of the
uncounseled sting operation (Transcript of June 7th and 8th 1988
at p. 11). He specifically ruled that defendant had not been
denied effective assistance of counsel.

Lei- Accordingly, he

denied defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to recuse and set
the matter for trial.

Id.

at 12.

It is well-established that a defendant must show some
degree of demonstrable prejudice in order to successfully argue
error based on prosecutorial misconduct.
P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988).

State v. Lafferty, 749

Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides that any "error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a
party shall be disregarded."
(1982).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30(a)

In the absence of showing of prejudice, any error must

be deemed harmless.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).

Error is not harmless if a review of the record persuades the
court that without the error there was Ma reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result for the defendant.
680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984).
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State v. Fontana,

In the present case, defendant claims that his
attorney, Mr. Calver, was rendered ineffective as a result of the
claimed prosecutional misconduct.
Calver acted ineffectively.

He does not claim that Mr.

Nor does he claim that Mr. Calver

was precluded somehow in preparing a defense.

In fact, Mr.

Calver had not entered his appearance until after defendant's
preliminary hearing and had simply filed several pre-trial
motions which were subsequently pursued by succeeding counsel (R.
645).

Defendant simply claims that Mr. Calver was not present

during or informed of the sting operation.
Assuming that the contact between defendant and the
prosecution was improper, defendant fails to state how the result
of his trial would have been different in the absence of the
contact.

The evidence shows that the prosecutor at trial was

shielded from any knowledge or information disclosed in the sting
operation (R. 605, 677-78, 707). There is no evidence that
defendant was prejudiced in preparing his defense or that his
defense was made ineffective.

Finally, the eyewitness and

physical evidence was so overwhelmingly incriminating that there
is no likelihood that the outcome of the trial could have been
affected by any pretrial contact between defendant and the
prosecution.
1988).

See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah

Accordingly, this court should conclude that the claimed

pretrial irregularities were harmless at best.

*JI

_

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed,
lis ^
^
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

d
day of July, 1989

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and accuracte copies of
the foregoing brief of respondent were mailed, postage pre-paid,
to Robert L. Froerer, Public Defender Assoc, 2568 Washington
Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, this r _ I T

da

Y

of

JulY/ 1989.

